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Summer 2003
HOW WE LEARN
ASK THE COGNITIVE SCIENTIST
Students Remember...What They Think About
How does the mind work--and especially how does it learn?
Teachers make assumptions all day long about how students best comprehend,
remember, and create. These assumptions--and the teaching decisions that
result--are based on a mix of theories learned in teacher education, trial
and error, craft knowledge, and gut instinct. Such gut knowledge often
serves us well. But is there anything sturdier to rely on?
Cognitive science is an interdisciplinary field of researchers from
psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, philosophy, computer science, and
anthropology who seek to understand the mind. In this regular American
Educator column, we will consider findings from this field that
are strong and clear enough to merit classroom application.
Daniel T. Willingham
Issue: The teacher presents a strong, coherent lesson in which a set
of significant facts is clearly connected to a reasonable conclusion. But,
at test time, the students show no understanding of the connections. Some
students parrot back the conclusion, but no facts. Others spit back
memorized facts, but don’t see how they fit together. Though the lesson
wasn’t taught in a rote way, it seems like rote knowledge is what the
students took in. Why do well-integrated, coherent lessons often come back
to us in a less meaningful, fragmented form? Can cognitive science help
explain why this result is so common--and offer ideas about how to avoid it?
Response: Rote knowledge is devoid of all meaning (as discussed in my
last column, Winter 2002). The
knowledge that these students appear to be regurgitating is probably not
rote knowledge. It is probably "shallow" knowledge: The students’ knowledge
has meaning (unlike rote knowledge), in that the students understand each
isolated part, but their knowledge lacks the deeper meaning that comes from
understanding the relationship among the parts. For reasons noted below,
this is a common problem in the early stages of learning about a new topic.
But it also has another remediable source, which is the focus of this
column.
Cognitive science has shown that what ends up in a learner’s memory is not
simply the material presented--it is the product of what the learner thought
about when he or she encountered the material. This principle illuminates
one important origin of shallow knowledge and also suggests how to help
students develop deep and interconnected knowledge.
* * *
Let’s start with an example of shallow knowledge. Suppose
that you are teaching a high school class unit on World War II and develop a
lesson on the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Many facts might be included
in such a lesson: (a) Japan had aspirations to be a regional power; (b)
Japan was engaged in a protracted war with China; (c) because they were at
war, European countries could not protect their colonies in the South
Pacific; and (d) the attack on Pearl Harbor resulted in a declaration of war
on Japan by the United States. The overarching point of this lesson might be
to show that the attack on Pearl Harbor was a strategic mistake for the
Japanese, given their war aims. (See Figure 1 for a diagram of the lesson.)
We can see two ways that this meaningful lesson might end up
as shallow knowledge in the student’s mind. The student might commit to
memory some or all of these four facts. But knowing these facts without
understanding how they relate to one another and can be integrated to
support the conclusion leaves the facts isolated; they are not without
meaning, but neither are they as rich as they might be. The student has the
trees, but no view of the forest.
Alternatively, the student might commit to memory the conclusion, "The
attack on Pearl Harbor, although militarily a successful battle for Japan,
was ultimately detrimental to its long-range war plans." But memorizing this
conclusion without understanding the reasoning behind it and knowing the
supporting facts is empty. It isn’t rote--the student knows Japan initiated
and won a battle at the place called Pearl Harbor. But the knowledge
certainly is "shallow"--it has no connections.**
We have all had students memorize phrases from class or a textbook more or
less word-for-word, and although what the student says is accurate, we can’t
help but wonder whether he or she really understands the ideas those words
represent. Let’s dig deeper.
Memory Is as Thinking Does
When students parrot back a teacher’s or the textbook’s words, they are, of
course, drawing on memory. Thus, the question of why students end up with
shallow knowledge is really a question about the workings of memory.
Needless to say, determining what ends up in memory and in what form is a
complex question, but there is one factor that trumps most others in
determining what is remembered: what you think about when you encounter the
material. The fact that the material you are dealing with has meaning
does not guarantee that the meaning will be remembered. If you think about
that meaning, the meaning will reside in memory. If you don’t, it
won’t. For example, if I teach about Pearl Harbor, some sailing enthusiasts
may starting thinking about the ships of the era and pay minimal attention
to the rest of the class--just a few minutes after the bell rings they won’t
remember much about the causes and consequences of Pearl Harbor. Memory is
as thinking does.
A classic experiment illustrating this principle was conducted by Thomas
Hyde and James Jenkins in 1969. It examined how one thinks about material
and the effect of that thinking on memory. Subjects in their experiment
listened to a list of words at a rate of one word every two seconds.
Different groups of subjects were to perform different tasks upon hearing
each word. Some were to rate each word as to whether it made them think of
pleasant or unpleasant things, whereas others were asked to count the number
of times the letter E appeared in the word. Rating the pleasantness
forces the subject to think about the word’s meaning; the word garbage
is unpleasant because of what it means--what it is associated with in one’s
memory. Counting E s, on the other hand, forces one to think about
the spelling of the word, but not its meaning. Thus, the experimenters
manipulated what subjects thought about when they encountered each word.
Subjects were not told that their memory for the words would later be
tested; they thought they were merely to make the pleasantness or the E
-counting judgment.
One other detail of the experiment is especially important. The word list
actually consisted of 12 pairs of very highly associated words, such as
doctor-nurse, although this fact was not pointed out to any of the subjects.
The order in which the words were read was random (except that related words
were not allowed to be next to one another in the list).
The results are shown in Figure 2. First look at the left side of the chart,
which shows the mean number of words recalled. Memory was much better when
subjects made the pleasantness ratings. Thinking about the meaning of
material is especially helpful to memory. This finding is consistent across
hundreds of other experiments.
The right side of the figure shows a measure of clustering--the extent to
which subjects paired the associated words as they tried to remember them.
When a subject recalled a word (e.g., doctor ), what percentage of
the time was the next word recalled the highly associated one (nurse
)? As the figure shows, subjects who thought about the word’s meaning (i.e.,
rated pleasantness) not only remembered more words, they tended to remember
the related words together, even though the related words did not appear
together in the list. The subjects who counted E s did not tend to
remember related words together.
These results forcefully make the point that meaningful structure that is in
the environment may or may not end up being stored in memory. In the Hyde
and Jenkins experiment, the fact that some of the words were related in
meaning was largely lost on the subjects who counted E s because
thinking about E s did not encourage the subjects to process meaning.
Subjects who made the pleasantness ratings tended to group the words
together by meaning as they recalled them. Whatever subjects thought about
when they heard the words (which, teachers will note, depends on what they
were asked to think about) was what ended up in memory.
In the Hyde and Jenkins experiment, the "what they think about" principle is
divided into thinking about meaning versus not thinking about meaning. Other
experiments show that even if one thinks about meaning, the particular
aspect of the meaning that one considers will be stored in memory, and
other aspects of meaning will not. For example, in one experiment (Barclay
et al., 1974), subjects were presented with words to remember in the context
of a sentence. The sentence biased subjects to think of one or another
feature of the to-be-remembered word: For example, some subjects read "The
man lifted the piano," which encouraged thinking about the fact that
pianos are heavy. Other subjects read "The man tuned the piano,"
which encouraged considering that pianos produce music. In the next phase of
the experiment subjects were told that their memory for some of the nouns in
the sentences would be tested and that for each sentence they would get a
hint. For piano, some subjects were given the hint, "something
heavy." If they had read the sentence about lifting the piano, this hint
matched the feature they had thought about, but if they read the sentence
about tuning the piano, the hint didn’t match. (Other subjects saw a hint
that matched the piano tuning sentence; that hint was "something with a nice
sound.")
The results showed that subjects remembered about three times as many words
when the hint for the test matched what subjects had thought about when they
first read the word. Again, the point is that what is stored in memory is
quite specific to what you think about when you encounter the material. It
is not the case that if you think about piano, then piano and
all of its features are stored in memory. You might think about its
music-producing qualities, its weight, its cost, and so on. Or you might not
focus on the referent at all, but rather on the physical properties of the
word itself, as when Hyde and Jenkins asked subjects to count E s. In
each case, what you think about is what you remember.
So what does this have to do with shallow knowledge? It shows where shallow
knowledge might come from. Meaning that is in the environment won’t end up
in memory if students don’t think about it. Students with shallow knowledge
have apparently thought about the material in a shallow way. This conclusion
reframes the question we might ask: Why would students think about the
material in a shallow way, given that we didn’t present it to them that way?
Obviously, a student would learn only isolated facts or unsupported
conclusions if that is what the teacher taught, but I find it difficult to
believe that this is a common practice. The notion that education should
emphasize meaning is deeply ingrained in our system and has been for a
generation or more. There cannot be many teachers who ask their students to
learn facts without concern for a larger picture. So how do students end up
with shallow knowledge? There are several possible answers.
-
As noted at the
beginning of this article, in one form, shallow knowledge is simply a step
on the way to deep knowledge. Consider again the hierarchical diagram shown
in Figure 1. I argued that shallow knowledge could either be memorization of
the conclusion (top of the hierarchy) without knowing the facts that back it
up (bottom of the hierarchy), or memorization of the facts without
integrating them into a conclusion. Clearly the sort of deep knowledge we
want our students to have is objectively harder to obtain than shallow
knowledge, because knowledge of the facts and knowledge of the
conclusion and knowledge of their interrelationships are prerequisite
to it. We want students to know how the different levels of hierarchy relate
to one another; it’s not enough to have memorized each level in isolation of
the others. That connected knowledge will inevitably be the last thing that
the student acquires. Thus, some students’ knowledge will be shallow simply
because they are not far enough along yet.
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Other students may effectively quit learning before they
reach the deep understanding that is our goal for them. A student may learn
the facts about Pearl Harbor and think "All right, I’ve learned a lot about
this stuff." The student is correct (so far as it goes) and simply doesn’t
realize that there is yet more to do.
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Students’ perception of what they are supposed to learn--and
what it means to learn--may contribute to shallow knowledge. A student may
seek to memorize definitions and pat phrases word-for-word from the book
because the student knows that this information is correct and cannot
be contested. When I was in eighth grade, we were given a list of vocabulary
terms that we were to define and then study in preparation for a weekly
test. A friend defined "cherub" as "an angel of the second order." My
friends and I teased him because his definition missed what we thought was
the key aspect of the word--that a cherub is small, chubby, and
rosy-cheeked. He was unmoved and kept repeating "that’s what the dictionary
said." He liked the fact that his answer was uncontestable. Students may
memorize exactly what the teacher or textbook says in order to be certain
that they are correct, and worry less about the extent to which they
understand.
-
Despite what was offered to students in the teacher’s
lesson, the students attended to (thought about) something different--and
that’s what they remembered.
What Does This Mean for Teachers?
This fundamental principle of memory--memory is as thinking does--yields a
clear strategy to encourage deep, meaningful knowledge. If students think
about the meaning of material, meaning will end up in memory. How can
teachers be sure that students are thinking about meaning?
Obviously there is no one way to ensure that students think about the
meaning of material. A compelling story may be appropriate for one lesson,
whereas a carefully designed laboratory project works for a second, and a
well-structured group discussion for a third. One possible common
misconception is that learners can only understand meaning if they
themselves construct the meaning in a physically active way. A moment’s
reflection should tell us that "listening" does not imply passivity or
shallowness. We have all been to "active, participatory" workshops that felt
like a waste of time, and we have been to lectures where we "just listened"
that were gripping and informative. Constructing meaning is a matter of
being mentally engaged; being physically engaged might help at times,
but it is not necessary.
How can we ensure that students are mentally engaged? While there is still
more to learn about applying this research on thinking and memory to
teaching, several key principles have emerged to guide teachers in
developing assignments, classroom activities, and assessments.
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Anticipate what your lesson will lead students to think
about. The direct relationship between thought and memory is so
important that it could be used as a self-check for a teacher preparing
virtually any assignment: Always try to anticipate what students will be
thinking when they are doing the assignment. Doing so may make it clear
that some assignments designed with one purpose in mind will achieve
another. For example, a teacher once told me that, as part of a unit on the
Underground Railroad, he had his students bake biscuits so that they would
appreciate what escaped slaves ate most nights. He asked what I thought of
the assignment and my reply was that his students will remember baking
biscuits. In other words, his students probably thought for 30 seconds about
the relation of the baking to the course material, and then spent 30 minutes
thinking about measuring flour, mixing dough, and so on.
Another example comes from my recent observation of my nephew as he
completed a book report. The teacher asked the students to draw a poster
that depicted all of the events of the book. The purpose of the assignment
was to have students think of the book as a whole, and to consider how the
separate events related to one another. This purpose got lost in the
execution. My nephew spent a lot more time thinking about how to draw a good
castle than he did about the plot of the book.
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Use discovery learning carefully. The
principle above--anticipate the students’ thoughts--also illuminates the use
and misuse of discovery learning. There is little doubt that students
remember material they generate themselves better than material that is
handed to them. This "generation effect," as it is called (Slamecka & Graf,
1978), is indeed powerful, and it is due, in part, to forcing the learner to
think about the meaning of material (although other techniques can do that
as well). Part of the effect does seem to be unique to the actual generation
of the answer, over and above thinking about meaning. One might suppose,
therefore, that discovery learning should be employed whenever possible.
However, given that memory follows thought, one thing is clear: Students
will remember incorrect "discoveries" just as well as correct ones.
Considerable care must be taken to ensure that the path of students’
thoughts will be a profitable one. For example, advocates of discovery
learning often point out that children learn to use some computer software
rapidly and effectively merely by "playing around with it." That may be
true, but that learning environment is also quite structured in that
profitless actions are immediately discouraged by the system not working. In
effect, the system is so structured that profitless discoveries are
impossible; but few classroom activities can achieve this kind of structure.
How much anatomy will students learn by "playing around" with frog
dissection? Can one anticipate the thoughts of students who dissect frogs
with little direction? Although discovery learning may be powerful in highly
structured contexts that make the correct discovery virtually inevitable, in
others it is likely to prove unproductive.
Design reading assignments that require students to
actively process the text. Many concrete strategies have been suggested
for helping students to get more out of reading that likely have some or all
of their effect by making readers think about the meaning of what they are
reading. Techniques such as writing outlines, self-examination during
learning, review questions, and previews can encourage or require students
to integrate the material and to thereby process (i.e., think about) the
meaning. These different techniques are more or less effective in
different situations, perhaps due to the specific materials being studied
(e.g., McDaniel & Einstein, 1989); general principles guiding when each
technique should be used have not been forthcoming. Nevertheless, although
one technique or another may be more effective for a given lesson or group
of students, using any strategy that encourages the processing of meaning is
almost always better than not using one.
Design lessons so that students can’t avoid thinking
about the lesson’s goal. On a more positive note, the "memory is as
thinking does" principle can yield steps teachers can take to help students
develop deep, interconnected knowledge: Lessons should be directed so
that students are very likely to think (or can’t help but think) about the
goal of the lesson. The goal of the Underground Railroad lesson was not
really about biscuits--it was to encourage students to consider the
experience of escaped slaves. Therefore, a more effective starting point for
that lesson would be to ask students leading questions that encourage
consideration of what escaped slaves’ experiences would be like, which might
include questions of how they would obtain food, and what the constraints
were on the food they could get (inexpensive, cooked rapidly, etc.). My
nephew would have gotten more out of his book report project if it had
emphasized what the teacher was really interested in (the connection among
the book’s events), perhaps by having the students label the events and
connections among them (e.g., this event moves the character towards his
goal; this event causes that event) and de-emphasizing the students’
artistic contribution by having them use clip art or simply writing the
events in words.
Design tests that lead students to think about and integrate
the most important material. The "memory is as thinking does" principle may
also be applied to methods of assessing student knowledge: Like lessons,
study guides for texts should be developed that force students to think
about the goals of the lessons being assessed. For better or worse, some
students expend their greatest effort to understand material as they prepare
for an examination. Even if you would rather see such students motivated by
a passion to learn, you can use the students’ motivation to earn a good
grade to ensure that they are getting the most out of your lessons.
Announcing the general topics to be covered on an exam leaves the specifics
of what to learn up to the student. Even if the teacher emphasizes that deep
understanding will be tested, the student may misconstrue what is deep or,
as noted earlier, the student may quit once some facts have been memorized,
believing that he or she has already done quite a bit of studying. Suppose,
however, that the teacher provides a list of integrative questions for the
students to study from, such as "Describe why the attack on Pearl Harbor was
a strategic mistake by Japan, given its war aims." Suppose further that the
students know that the examination will consist of five questions from the
30-question list that they have been given, with an essay to be written on
each of the five questions. Students will very likely restrict their
studying to the 30 question list, but that might be just fine with the
teacher if he or she feels that any student who can answer those 30
questions has mastered the material. This method of testing has the
advantage of ensuring that while students are highly motivated, they think
about the deepest meaning of the material that the teacher intended.
In summary, in the early stages of learning, students may
display "shallow" learning. These students have acquired bits of knowledge
that aren’t well-integrated into a larger picture. Research tells us that
deep, connected knowledge can be encouraged by getting students to think
about the interrelation of the various pieces of knowledge that they have
acquired. Cognitive science has not progressed to the point that it can
issue prescriptions of exactly how that can be achieved--that job is very
much in the hands of experienced teachers. But in considering how to
encourage students to acquire meaningful knowledge, teachers will do well to
keep the "memory is as thinking does" principle in mind.
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Readers can pose specific questions to:
"Cognitive Scientist," American Educator
555 New Jersey Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20001
or
e-mail to :
amered@aft.org |
Daniel T. Willingham is associate professor of cognitive
psychology and neuroscience at the University of Virginia and author of
Cognition: The Thinking Animal. His research focuses on the role
of consciousness in learning.
** My last column (Winter 2002, available at
www.aft.org/american_educator/winter2002/CogSci.html) discussed another
common problem for students: inflexible knowledge. Like shallow knowledge,
inflexible knowledge is meaningful--the catch is that it doesn’t translate
well to other relevant situations. To extend our World War II example, a
student with inflexible knowledge may learn the conclusion and an adequate
number of supporting facts, developing a real understanding of Japan’s
mistake. But, when the history class moved on to study another war, the
student may not recognize an analogous strategic mistake. Developing
flexible knowledge, such as being able to track strategic mistakes as a
theme throughout military history (or to generalize, for example, to
corporate history) requires much
further study.
References
Barclay, J. R., Bransford, J. D., Franks, J. J., McCarrel, N. S., & Nitsch,
K. (1974). Comprehension and semantic flexibility. Journal of Verbal
Learning & Verbal Behavior, 13, 471-481.
Hyde, T. S. & Jenkins, J. J. (1969). Differential effects of incidental
tasks on the organization of recall of a list of highly associated words.
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 82, 472-481.
McDaniel, M. A. & Einstein, G. O. (1989). Material-appropriate processing: A
contextualist approach to reading and studying strategies. Educational
Psychology Review, 1, 113-145.
Slamecka, N. J, & Graf, P. (1978). The generation effect: Delineation of a
phenomenon. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning & Memory,
4, 592-604.

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