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Fall 2003
Genocide in Rwanda
by Philip Gourevitch
Reading Lolita in
Tehran by Azar Nafisi
Glimpses of Tyranny and
Resistance
Alan Charles Kors writes in
Education for Democracy that justice, freedom, peace, and mutual forbearance
are not "the normal state of things in human affairs"; they are the
exception. What has the more common lot of humanity been? What understanding
of the "normal state of things" has driven generations of democrats in the
U.S. and elsewhere to build, strengthen, and defend free society?
Students should have answers to these questions. As Diane Ravitch has shown,
textbooks don’t supply them. We don’t want to drown our children in the grim
realities of tyranny, but the subject deserves their serious study. They
should know, for example, that tyrannical regimes often strengthen their
power by stirring latent resentments--whether against Jews and Gypsies in
Hitler’s Germany, teachers and intellectuals in Mao’s China, or recently
Tutsis in Rwanda.
And where there’s tyranny, there’s also heroic, creative resistance. The
stories are inspiring--and constitute a vital piece of students’ civic
development.
In the "Glimpses" that follow, we witness the terrible genocide of Rwanda’s
minority Tutsis, and the resilience of Iranian women who find freedom in
literature.
--Editor
Genocide in Rwanda
For over three decades prior to the genocide of 1994, the Tutsis of Rwanda
were subject to periodic massacres by the majority Hutu population. Author
Philip Gourevitch explains, "This is how Rwandan Tutsis count the years of
their lives: in hopscotch fashion--’59, ’60, ’61, ’63, and so on, through
’94--sometimes skipping several years, when they knew no terror, sometimes
slowing down to name the months and the days."
By the late 1980s, the Rwandan government, led by President Habyarimana and
his wife Madame Agathe Habyarimana’s influential family, was increasingly
totalitarian--in control of the media, most jobs, the country’s one
political party and much more. The government’s power to induce the
population to carry out its will was immense. Like other tyrants in other
times and places, Rwanda’s Hutu Power government played on ethnic hatreds to
build its own power and then systematically unleashed those hatreds in the
most horrific of ways.
Following his Prologue, we pick up Gourevitch’s devastating story as the
massacres of 1992, a prelude to the genocide of 1994, were just beginning.
--Editor
Philip Gourevitch
Decimation means the killing of every tenth person in a population, and in
the spring and early summer of 1994 a program of massacres decimated the
Republic of Rwanda. Although the killing was low-tech--performed largely by
machete--it was carried out at dazzling speed: Of an original population of
about seven and a half million, at least 800,000 people were killed in just
a hundred days. Rwandans often speak of a million deaths, and they may be
right. The dead of Rwanda accumulated at nearly three times the rate of
Jewish dead during the Holocaust. It was the most efficient mass killing
since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
* * *
So it went--an attack here, a massacre there--as the increasingly
well-organized Hutu extremists stockpiled weapons, and Hutu youth militias
were recruited and trained for "civil defense." First among these militias
was the interhamwe --"those who attack together"--which had its
genesis in soccer fan clubs sponsored by leaders of the National
Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND), the president’s political
party which, by law, every citizen was a member of for life, and the
akazu.
1
The economic collapse of the late 1980s had left tens of thousands of young
men without any prospect of a job, wasting in idleness and its attendant
resentments, and ripe for recruitment. The interhamwe, and the
various copycat groups that were eventually subsumed into it, promoted
genocide as a carnival romp. Hutu Power youth leaders, jetting around on
motorbikes and sporting pop hairstyles, dark glasses, and flamboyantly
colored pajama suits and robes, preached ethnic solidarity and civil defense
to increasingly packed rallies, where alcohol usually flowed freely, giant
banners splashed with hagiographic portraits of [President] Habyarimana
flapped in the breeze, and paramilitary drills were conducted like the
latest hot dance moves. The President and his wife [Madame Agathe
Habyarimana] often turned out to be cheered at these spectacles, while in
private the members of the interhamwe were organized into small
neighborhood bands, drew up lists of Tutsis, and went on retreats to
practice burning houses, tossing grenades, and hacking dummies up with
machetes.
Play first turned to work for the interhamwe in early March of 1992,
when the state-owned Radio Rwanda announced the "discovery" of a Tutsi plan
to massacre Hutus. This was pure misinformation, but in preemptive
"self-defense," militia members and villagers in the Bugesera region, south
of Kigali, slaughtered 300 Tutsis in three days. Similar killings occurred
at the same time in Gisenyi, and in August, shortly after Habyarimana--under
intense pressure from international donors--signed a cease-fire with the
RPF,2
Tutsis were massacred in Kibuye. That October, the cease-fire was expanded
to embrace plans for a new, transitional government that would include the
RPF; one week later, Habyarimana delivered a speech dismissing the truce as
"nothing but a scrap of paper."
Still, the foreign-aid money poured into Habyarimana’s coffers, and weapons
kept arriving--from France, from Egypt, from apartheid South Africa.3
Occasionally, when donors expressed concern about the killings of Tutsis,
there were arrests, but releases followed swiftly; nobody was brought to
trial, much less prosecuted for the massacres. To soothe foreign nerves, the
government portrayed the killings as "spontaneous" and "popular" acts of
"anger" or "self-protection." The villagers knew better: Massacres were
invariably preceded by political "consciousness-raising" meetings at which
local leaders, usually with a higher officer of the provincial or national
government at their side, described Tutsis as devils--horns, hoofs, tails,
and all--and gave the order to kill them, according to the old revolutionary
lingo, as a "work assignment." The local authorities consistently profited
from massacres, seizing slain Tutsis’ land and possessions, and sometimes
enjoying promotions if they showed special enthusiasm, and the civilian
killers, too, were usually rewarded with petty spoils.
In retrospect, the massacres of the early 1990s can be seen as dress
rehearsals for what proponents of Hutuness themselves called the "final
solution" in 1994. Yet there was nothing inevitable about the horror. With
the advent of multipartyism [which had been pressed on the Habyarimana
government by the international community], the President had been compelled
by popular pressure to make substantial concessions to reform-minded
oppositionists, and it required a dogged uphill effort for Habyarimana’s
extremist entourage to prevent Rwanda from slipping toward moderation.
Violence was the key to that effort. The interhamwe was bankrolled
and supervised by a consortium of akazu leaders, who also ran their own
death squads, with names like the Zero Network and the Bullets group. Madame
Habyarimana’s three brothers, along with a bevy of colonels and leaders of
the northwestern business mafia, were founding members of these outfits,
which first rolled into action alongside the interhamwe during the
Bugesera massacre in March of 1992. But the most crucial innovation at
Bugesera was the use of the national radio to prepare the ground for
slaughter, and the ratcheting up of the suggestive message of us against
them to the categorically compelling kill or be killed.
Genocide, after all, is an exercise in community building. A vigorous
totalitarian order requires that the people be invested in the leaders’
scheme, and while genocide may be the most perverse and ambitious means to
this end, it is also the most comprehensive. In 1994, Rwanda was regarded in
much of the rest of the world as the exemplary instance of the chaos and
anarchy associated with collapsed states. In fact, the genocide was the
product of order, authoritarianism, decades of modern political theorizing
and indoctrination, and one of the most meticulously administered states in
history. And strange as it may sound, the ideology--or what Rwandans call
"the logic"--of genocide was promoted as a way not to create suffering but
to alleviate it. The specter of an absolute menace that requires absolute
eradication binds leader and people in a hermetic utopian embrace, and the
individual--always an annoyance to totality--ceases to exist.
The mass of participants in the practice massacres of the early 1990s may
have taken little pleasure in obediently murdering their neighbors. Still,
few refused, and assertive resistance was extremely rare. Killing Tutsis was
a political tradition in postcolonial Rwanda; it brought people together.
It has become a commonplace in the past 50 years to say that the
industrialized killings of the Holocaust calls into question the notion of
human progress, since art and science can lead straight through the famous
gate--stamped with the words "Work Makes You Free"--to Auschwitz. Without
all that technology, the argument goes, the Germans couldn’t have killed all
those Jews. Yet it was the Germans, not the machinery, who did the killing.
Rwanda’s Hutu Power leaders understood this perfectly. If you could swing
the people who would swing the machetes, technological underdevelopment was
no obstacle to genocide. The people were the weapon, and that meant
everybody: The entire Hutu population had to kill the entire Tutsi
population. In addition to ensuring obvious numerical advantages, this
arrangement eliminated any questions of accountability that might arise. If
everybody is implicated, then implication becomes meaningless. Implication
in what? A Hutu who thought there was anything to be implicated in would
have to be an accomplice of the enemy.
"We the people are obliged to take responsibility ourselves and wipe out
this scum," explained Leon Mugesera, in November of 1992, during the same
speech in which he urged Hutus to return the Tutsis to Ethiopia by way of
the Nyabarongo River. Mugesera was a doctor, a vice president of the MRND,
and a close friend and adviser of Habyarimana. His voice was the voice of
power, and most Rwandans can still quote from his famous speech quite
accurately; members of the interhamwe often recited favorite phrases
as they went forth to kill. The law, Mugesera claimed, mandated death to
"accomplices" of the "cockroaches," and he asked, "What are we waiting for
to execute the sentence?" Members of opposition parties, he said, "have no
right to live among us," and as a leader of "the Party," he invoked his duty
to spread the alarm and to instruct the people to "defend themselves." As
for the "cockroaches" themselves, he wondered, "What are we waiting for to
decimate these families?" He called on those who had prospered under
Habyarimana to "finance operations to eliminate these people." He spoke of
1959 [one of the early massacres of Tutsis], saying it had been a terrible
mistake to allow Tutsis to survive. "Destroy them," he said. "No matter what
you do, do not let them get away," and he said, "Remember that the person
whose life you save will certainly not save yours." He finished with the
words "Drive them out. Long live President Habyarimana."
On the evening of April 6, 1994, Thomas Kamilindi was in high spirits. His
wife, Jacqueline, had baked a cake for a festive dinner at their home in
Kigali. It was Thomas’s 33rd birthday, and that afternoon he had completed
his last day of work as a reporter for Radio Rwanda. After 10 years at the
state-owned station, Thomas, who was a Hutu, had resigned in protest against
the lack of political balance in news programming. He was taking a shower
when Jacqueline began pounding on the bathroom door. "Hurry up!" she
shouted. "The President has been attacked!" Thomas locked the doors of his
house and sat by the radio listening to Radio Television Libres des Milles
Collines (RTLM), a radio station created by the akazu. He disliked
the Hutu Power station’s violent propaganda, but the way things were going
in Rwanda, that propaganda often served as a highly accurate political
weather forecast. On April 3, RTLM had announced that during the next three
days "there will be a little something here in Kigali, and also on April 7
and 8 you will hear the sounds of bullets or grenades exploding." Now the
station was saying that President Habyarimana’s plane, returning from Dar es
Salaam, Tanzania, had been shot down over Kigali and had crashed into the
grounds of his own palace. The new Hutu President of Burundi and several of
Habyarimana’s top advisers had also been on board. There were no survivors.
Thomas, who had well-placed friends, had heard that large-scale massacres of
Tutsis were being prepared nationwide by the President’s extremist entourage
and that lists of Hutu oppositionists had been drawn up for the first wave
of killings. But he had never imagined that Habyarimana himself might be
targeted. If Hutu Power had sacrificed him, who was safe?
...Nobody, at that moment, was entirely sure who was in charge of the
decapitated government, but the roadblocks, the confident tone of the RTLM
announcers, and the reports of killing in the streets left little doubt that
Hutu Power was conducting a coup d’état. And it was. Although Habyarimana’s
assassins have never been positively identified, suspicion has focused on
the extremists in his own entourage--notably the semi-retired Colonel
Théoneste Bagasora, an intimate of President Habyarimana’s wife Madame
Agathe Habyarimana, and a charter member of the akazu and its death squads,
who had said in January of 1993 that he was preparing the apocalypse. But
regardless of who killed Habyarimana, the fact remains that the organizers
of the genocide were primed to exploit his death instantaneously. (While
Rwanda’s Hutu Power elite spent the night cranking up the genocidal engines,
in Burundi, whose President had also been killed, the army and the United
Nations broadcast calls for calm, and this time Burundi did not explode.)
In the early evening of April 6, Colonel Bagasora had taken dinner as the
guest of the Bangladeshi battalion of UNAMIR.4
An hour after the President’s death, he was presiding over a meeting of a
self-anointed "crisis committee," a mostly military gathering at which Hutu
Power ratified its own coup and, because General Dallaire5
and the special representative of the U.N. Secretary-General were in
attendance, paid lip service to continuing the Arusha6
process. The meeting broke up around midnight. By then the capital was
already crawling with soldiers, interhamwe, and members of the elite
Presidential Guard, equipped with lists of people to kill. The assassins’
first priority was to eliminate Hutu opposition leaders, including the Hutu
Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, whose house was one of many that were
surrounded at daybreak on April 7. A contingent of 10 Belgian UNAMIR
soldiers arrived on the scene, but the Prime Minister fled over her garden
wall and was killed nearby. Before the Belgians could leave, a Rwandan
officer drove up and ordered them to surrender their arms and to come with
him. The Belgians, outnumbered, were taken to Camp Kigali, the military base
in the center of town, where they were held for several hours, then
tortured, murdered, and mutilated.
After that, the wholesale extermination of Tutsis got underway, and the U.N.
troops offered little resistance to the killers. Foreign governments rushed
to shut down their embassies and evacuate their nationals. Rwandans who
pleaded for rescue were abandoned, except for a few special cases like
Madame Agathe Habyarimana, who was spirited to Paris on a French military
transport. The RPF, which had remained prepared for combat throughout the
stalled peace-implementation period, resumed its war less than 24 hours
after Habyarimana’s death, simultaneously moving its troops out of their
Kigali barracks to secure an area of high ground around the parliament, and
launching a major offensive from the "demilitarized zone" in the northeast.
The government army fought back fiercely, allowing the people to get on with
their murderous work. "You cockroaches must know you are made of flesh," a
broadcaster gloated over RTLM. "We won’t let you kill. We will kill you."
With the encouragement of such messages and leaders at every level of
society, the slaughter of Tutsis and the assassination of Hutu
oppositionists spread from region to region. Following the militias’
example, Hutus, young and old, rose to the task. Neighbors hacked neighbors
to death in their homes, and colleagues hacked colleagues to death in their
workplaces. Doctors killed their patients, and schoolteachers killed their
pupils. Within days, the Tutsi populations of many villages were all but
eliminated, and in Kigali, prisoners were released in work gangs to collect
the corpses that lined the roadsides. Throughout Rwanda, mass rape and
looting accompanied the slaughter. Drunken militia bands, fortified with
assorted drugs from ransacked pharmacies, were bused from massacre to
massacre. Radio announcers reminded listeners not to take pity on women and
children. As an added incentive to the killers, Tutsis’ belongings were
parceled out in advance--the radio, the couch, the goat, the opportunity to
rape a young girl. A council woman in one Kigali neighborhood was reported
to have offered 50 Rwandan francs apiece (about 30 cents at the time) for
severed Tutsi heads, a practice known as "selling cabbages."
* * *
In May of 1994, I happened to be in Washington to visit the U.S. Holocaust
Memorial Museum, an immensely popular tourist attraction adjacent to the
National Mall. The ticket line formed two hours before opening time. Waiting
amid the crowd, I tried to read a local newspaper. But I couldn’t get past a
photograph on the front page: bodies swirling in water, dead bodies, bloated
and colorless, bodies so numerous that they jammed against each other and
clogged the stream. The caption explained that these were the corpses of
genocide victims in Rwanda. Looking up from the paper, I saw a group of
museum staffers arriving for work. On their maroon blazers, several wore the
lapel buttons that sold for a dollar each in the museum shop, inscribed with
the slogans "Remember" and "Never Again." The museum was just a year old; at
its inaugural ceremony, President Clinton had described it as "an investment
in a secure future against whatever insanity lurks ahead." Apparently, all
he meant was that the victims of future exterminations could now die knowing
that a shrine already existed in Washington D.C., where their suffering
might be commemorated, but at the time, his meaning seemed to carry a bolder
promise.
By early June, the Secretary-General of the U.N.--and even, in an odd
moment, the French Foreign Minister--had taken to describing the slaughter
in Rwanda as "genocide." But the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights
still favored the phrase "possible genocide," while the Clinton
administration actually forbade unqualified use of the g-word. The official
formulation approved by the White House was: "acts of genocide may have
occurred." When Christine Shelley, a State Department spokeswoman, tried to
defend this semantic squirm at a press briefing on June 10, she was asked
how many acts of genocide it takes to make a genocide. She said she wasn’t
in "a position to answer," adding dimly, "There are formulations that we are
using that we are trying to be consistent in our use of." Pressed to define
an act of genocide, Shelley recited the definition of the crime from the
Genocide Convention of 1948, which the U.S. only got around to signing in
1989, 14 years after Rwanda itself had done so. A State Department
transcript of the briefing records the ensuing exchange:
Question: So you say genocide happens when certain acts happen, and you say
that those acts have happened in Rwanda. So why can’t you say that genocide
has happened?
Ms. Shelley: Because, Alan, there is a reason for the selection of words
that we have made, and I have--perhaps I have--I’m not a lawyer. I don’t
approach this from the international legal and scholarly point of view. We
try, best as we can, to accurately reflect a description in particularly
addressing that issue. It’s--the issue is out there. People have obviously
been looking at it.
Shelley was a bit more to the point when she rejected the denomination of
genocide, because, she said, "there are obligations which arise in
connection with the use of the term." She meant that if it was a genocide,
the Convention of 1948 required the contracting parties to act. Washington
didn’t want to act. So Washington pretended that is wasn’t a genocide--an
evasive posture that was in different ways shared by other major powers and
even members of the United Nations Secretariat, as well. Still, assuming
that the above exchange took about two minutes, an average of 11 Tutsis were
exterminated in Rwanda while it transpired.
Philip Gourevitch is a staff writer at the New Yorker and
has reported from Africa, Asia, and Europe for magazines such as Harper’s
and Granta. Between May 1995 and April 1998, Philip
Gourevitch spent nine months in Rwanda collecting stories from the survivors
of the 1994 genocide. The result is a compelling book--We Wish to Inform
You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: Stories from Rwanda
--that takes its name from a letter by seven Tutsi pastors who were
asking their colleague, a Hutu pastor, to intervene on their behalf. This
article is excerpted with permission of Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, LLC, New
York, ©1998.
1
Gourevitch writes, "The akazu was the core of the concentric
webs of political, economic, and military muscle that came to be known as
Hutu Power." It emanated from the influential family of President
Habyarimana’s wife, Agathe Kanzinga.
2 The
Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) was an army aimed at putting military
pressure on the Habyarimana regime. It was composed of Tutsis and anti-Hutu
Power Hutus who had taken refuge in neighboring Uganda. The existence of the
RPF was used by the Hutu Power government as one more excuse to stir
suspicion and hatred against the Tutsi population.
3 Among
the tragedies of Rwanda detailed in Gourevitch’s book, is the extent to
which foreign governments and the United Nations acted in ways, intentional
or not, that strengthened and sustained the Hutu government and its war on
the Tutsis.
4
The United Nations’ Assistance Mission in Rwanda, a peacekeeping mission
deployed six months earlier.
5
Major General Romeo Dallaire, a Canadian, who was in charge of U.N. forces
in Rwanda.
6
Negotiations for peace with the Rawandese Patriotic Front are often referred
to as the Arusha process because they took place in Arusha, Tanzania.

Reading Lolita in
Tehran
In 1979, Azar Nafisi returned to her native Iran to teach
literature at the prestigious University of Tehran. Engrossed in her love
of literature and teaching, she slowly came to understand the Islamic
revolution that was gripping her homeland. In the mid-1980s, Nafisi was
expelled from the University of Tehran for refusing to wear the veil. She
then taught at the Free Islamic University and Allameh Tabatabai
University, but grew increasingly frustrated with the restrictions they
imposed. While her rights were being taken away bit-by-bit, Nafisi
realized that, "Every great work of art...is a celebration, an act of
insubordination against the betrayals, horrors, and infidelities of life."
In 1995 she resigned her faculty position to hold secret literature
classes in her home with just a handful of her top female students. She
tells the story of the revolution, her classes, and her students in
Reading Lolita in Tehran, which Nafisi wrote after fleeing to the United
States in 1997.
Publishers Weekly said her book "transcends categorization as
memoir, literary criticism, or social history, though it is superb as all
three." This excerpt hints at the political changes that forced Nafisi
under the veil and explores the subversive side of great literature.
--Editor
Azar Nafisi
One day in the spring of 1981--I can still feel the sun and
the morning breeze on my cheeks--I became irrelevant. Just over a year after
I had returned to my country, my city, my home, I discovered that the same
decree that had transformed the single word Iran into the Islamic Republic
of Iran had made me--and all that I had been--irrelevant. The fact that I
shared this fate with many others did not help much.
In fact, I had become irrelevant sometime before then. After the so-called
cultural revolution that led to the closing down of universities, I was
essentially out of a job. We went to the university, but we had nothing much
to do. I took to writing a diary and reading Agatha Christie. Instead of
classes, we were summoned to endless meetings. The administration wanted us
to stop working and at the same time to pretend that nothing had changed.
Although the universities were closed, the faculty was required to be
present and to offer projects to the Committee on the Cultural Revolution.
These were idle days, whose only enduring feature was the lasting
friendships we formed with colleagues in our own and other departments. I
was the youngest and newest addition to the group and had a great deal to
learn. They told me about the prerevolutionary days, about excitement and
hope; they talked about some of their colleagues who had never returned.
The newly elected committee for the implementation of the cultural
revolution visited the Faculty of Law and Political Sciences and the Faculty
of Persian and Foreign Languages and Literature at the auditorium in the
School of Law. Despite the formal and informal instructions to the female
faculty and staff on the issue of the veil, until that day most women at our
university had not obeyed the new rules. That meeting was the first I had
attended at which all the female participants wore head scarves. All, that
is, except three: Farideh, Laleh, and me. We were independent and considered
eccentric, so the three of us went to that meeting unveiled.
The three members of the Committee on the Cultural Revolution sat rather
uncomfortably on the very high stage. Their expressions were by turns
haughty, nervous, and defiant. That meeting was the last at the University
of Tehran in which the faculty openly criticized the government and its
policies regarding higher education. Most were rewarded for their
impertinence by being expelled.
Farideh, Laleh, and I sat together conspicuously, like naughty children. We
whispered, we consulted one another, we kept thrusting our hands up to talk.
Farideh took the committee to task for using the university grounds to
torture and intimidate the students. I told the Revolutionary Committee that
my integrity as a teacher and a woman was being compromised by its
insistence that I wear the veil under false pretenses for a few thousand
tumans a month. The issue was not so much the veil itself as freedom of
choice. My grandmother had refused to leave the house for three months when
she was forced to unveil. I would be similarly adamant in my own refusal.
Little did I know that I would soon be given the choice of either veiling or
being jailed, flogged, and perhaps killed if I disobeyed.
After that meeting, one of my more pragmatic colleagues, a "modern" woman,
who decided to take up the veil and stayed there for another 17 years after
I was gone, told me with a hint of sarcasm in her voice, "You are fighting a
losing battle. Why lose your job over an issue like this? In another couple
of weeks you will be forced to wear the veil in the grocery stores."
The simplest answer, of course, was that the university was not a grocery
store. But she was right. Soon we would be forced to wear it everywhere. And
the morality squads, with their guns and Toyota patrols would guard the
streets to ensure our adherence. On that sunny day, however, when my
colleagues and I made our protest known, these incidents did not seem to be
preordained. So much of the faculty protested, we thought we might yet win.
In the fall of 1995, after resigning from my last academic post, I decided
to indulge myself and fulfill a dream. I chose seven of my best and most
committed students and invited them to come to my home every Thursday
morning to discuss literature. They were all women--to teach a mixed class
in the privacy of my home was too risky, even if we were discussing harmless
works of fiction.
For nearly two years, almost every Thursday morning, rain or shine, they
came to my house, and almost every time, I could not get over the shock of
seeing them shed their mandatory veils and robes and burst into color. When
my students came into that room, they took off more than their scarves and
robes. Gradually, each one gained an outline and a shape, becoming her own
inimitable self. Our world in that living room with its window framing my
beloved Elburz Mountains became our sanctuary, our self-contained universe,
mocking the reality of black-scarved, timid faces in the city that sprawled
below.
The theme of the class was the relation between fiction and reality. We read
Persian classical literature, such as the tales of our own lady of fiction,
Scheherazade, from A Thousand and One Nights, along with Western
classics--Pride and Prejudice, Madame Bovary, Daisy Miller, The Dean’s
December and, yes, Lolita. As I write the title of each book,
memories whirl in with the wind to disturb the quiet of this fall day in
another room in another country.
Here and now in that other world that cropped up so many times in our
discussions, I sit and reimagine myself and my students, my girls as I came
to call them, reading Lolita in a deceptively sunny room in
Tehran. But to steal the words from Humbert, the poet/criminal of Lolita, I
need you, the reader, to imagine us, for we won’t really exist if you don’t.
Against the tyranny of time and politics, imagine us the way we sometimes
didn’t dare to imagine ourselves: in our most private and secret moments, in
the most extraordinarily ordinary instances of life, listening to music,
falling in love, walking down the shady streets, or reading Lolita
in Tehran. And then imagine us again with all this confiscated, driven
underground, taken away from us.
We lived in a culture that denied any merit to literary works, considering
them important only when they were handmaidens to something seemingly more
urgent--namely ideology. This was a country where all gestures, even the
most private, were interpreted in political terms. The colors of my head
scarf or my father’s tie were symbols of Western decadence and imperialist
tendencies. Not wearing a beard, shaking hands with members of the opposite
sex, clapping or whistling in public meetings, were likewise considered
Western and therefore decadent--part of the plot by imperialists to bring
down our culture.
Our class was shaped within this context, in an attempt to escape the gaze
of the blind censor for a few hours each week. There, in that living room,
we rediscovered that we were also living, breathing human beings; and no
matter how repressive the state became, no matter how intimidated and
frightened we were, like Lolita we tried to escape and to create our own
little pockets of freedom. And like Lolita, we took every opportunity to
flaunt our insubordination: by showing a little hair from under our scarves,
insinuating a little color into the drab uniformity of our appearances,
growing our nails, falling in love, and listening to forbidden music.
An absurd fictionality ruled our lives. We tried to live in the open spaces,
in the chinks created between that room--our protective cocoon--and the
censor’s world of witches and goblins outside. Which of these two worlds was
more real, and to which did we really belong? We no longer knew the answers.
Perhaps one way of finding out the truth was to do what we did: to try to
imaginatively articulate these two worlds and, through that process, give
shape to our vision and identity.
How can I create this other world outside the room? I have no choice but to
appeal to your imagination. Let’s imagine one of the girls, say Sanaz,
leaving my house and let us follow her from there to her final destination.
She says her good-byes and puts on her black robe and scarf over her orange
shirt and jeans, coiling her scarf around her neck to cover her huge gold
earrings. She directs wayward strands of hair under the scarf, puts her
notes into her large bag, straps it on over her shoulder and walks out into
the hall. She pauses a moment on top of the stairs to put on thin lacy black
gloves to hide her nail polish.
We follow Sanaz down the stairs, out the door, and into the street. You
might notice that her gait and her gestures have changed. It is in her best
interest not to be seen, not be heard or noticed. She doesn’t walk upright,
but bends her head towards the ground and doesn’t look at passersby. She
walks quickly and with a sense of determination. The streets of Tehran and
other Iranian cities are patrolled by militia who ride in white Toyota
patrols, four gun-carrying men and women, sometimes followed by a minibus.
They are called the Blood of God. They patrol the streets to make sure that
women like Sanaz wear their veils properly, do not wear makeup, do not walk
in public with men who are not their fathers, brothers, or husbands. She
will pass slogans on the walls, quotations from Khomeini and a group called
the Party of God:
Men who wear ties are u.s. lackeys. Veiling is a woman’s protection.
Beside the slogan is a charcoal drawing of a woman: Her face is featureless
and framed by a dark chador.
My sister, guard your veil. My brother, guard your eyes.
If she gets on a bus, the seating is segregated. She must enter through the
rear door and sit in the back seats, allocated to women. Yet in taxis, which
accept as many as five passengers, men and women are squeezed together like
sardines, as the saying goes, and the same goes with minibuses, where so
many of my students complain of being harassed by bearded and God-fearing
men.
You might well ask, ‘What is Sanaz thinking as she walks the streets of
Tehran? How much does this experience affect her?’ Most probably, she tries
to distance her mind as much as possible from her surroundings. Perhaps she
is thinking of her brother or of her distant boyfriend and the time when she
will meet him in Turkey. Does she compare her own situation with her
mother’s when she was the same age? Is she angry that women of her mother’s
generation could walk the streets freely, enjoy the company of the opposite
sex, join the police force, become pilots, live under laws that were among
the most progressive in the world regarding women? Does she feel humiliated
by the new laws, by the fact that after the revolution, the age of marriage
was lowered from 18 to nine, that stoning became once more the punishment
for adultery and prostitution?
After our first discussion of Lolita I went to bed excited, thinking
about Mitra’s question. Why did Lolita or Madame Bovary fill
us with so much joy? Was there something wrong with these novels, or with
us? Were Flaubert and Nabokov unfeeling brutes? By the next Thursday, I had
formulated my thoughts and could not wait to share them with the class.
Nabokov calls every great novel a fairy tale, I said. Well, I would agree.
First, let me remind you that fairy tales abound with frightening witches
who eat children and wicked stepmothers who poison their beautiful
stepdaughters and weak fathers who leave their children behind in forests.
But the magic comes from the power of good, that force which tells us we
need not give in to the limitations and restrictions imposed on us by McFate,
as Nabokov called it.
Every fairy tale offers the potential to surpass present limits, so in a
sense the fairy tale offers you freedoms that reality denies. In all great
works of fiction, regardless of the grim reality they present, there is an
affirmation of life against the transience of that life, an essential
defiance. This affirmation lies in the way the author takes control of
reality by retelling it in his own way, thus creating a new world. Every
great work of art, I would declare pompously, is a celebration, an act of
insubordination against the betrayals, horrors, and infidelities of life.
The perfection and beauty of form rebels against the ugliness and shabbiness
of the subject matter. This is why we love Madame Bovary and cry for
Emma, why we greedily read Lolita as our heart breaks for its small,
vulgar, poetic, and defiant orphaned heroine.
Manna, a student who made poetry out of things most people cast aside, had
once written about a pair of pink socks for which she was reprimanded by the
Muslim Student’s Association. When she complained to her favorite professor,
he started teasing her about how she had already ensnared and trapped her
man, Nima, and did not need the pink socks to entrap him further.
These students, like the rest of their generation, were different from my
generation in one fundamental aspect. My generation complained of a loss,
the void in our lives that was created when our past was stolen from us,
making us exiles in our own country. Yet we had a past to compare with the
present; we had memories and images of what had been taken away. But my
girls spoke constantly of stolen kisses, films they had never seen and the
wind they had never felt on their skin. This generation had no past. Their
memory was of a half-articulated desire, something they had never had. It
was this lack, their sense of longing for the ordinary, taken-for-granted
aspects of life, that gave their words a certain luminous quality akin to
poetry.
I wonder if right now, at this moment, I were to turn to the people sitting
next to me in this café in a country that is not Iran and talk to them about
life in Tehran, how they would react. Would they condemn the tortures, the
executions, and the extreme acts of aggression? I think they would. But what
about the acts of transgression on our ordinary lives, like the desire to
wear pink socks?
I had asked my students if they remember the dance scene in Invitation to
a Beheading:* The jailer invites Cincinnatus to a dance. They begin a
waltz and move out into the hall. In a corner they run into a guard: "They
described a circle near him and glided back into the cell, and now
Cincinnatus regretted that the swoon’s friendly embrace had been so brief."
This movement in circles is the main movement of the novel. As long as he
accepts the sham world the jailers impose upon him, Cincinnatus will remain
their prisoner and will move within the circles of their creation. The worst
crime committed by totalitarian mindsets is that they force their citizens,
including their victims, to become complicit in their crimes. Dancing with
your jailer, participating in your own execution--that is an act of utmost
brutality. My students witnessed it in show trials on television and enacted
it every time they went out into the streets dressed as they were told to
dress. They had not become part of the crowd who watched the executions, but
they did not have the power to protest them either.
The only way to leave the circle, to stop dancing with the jailer, is to
find a way to preserve one’s individuality, that unique quality that evades
description but differentiates one human being from the other. That is why,
in their world, rituals--empty rituals--become so central. There was not
much difference between our jailers and Cincinnatus’s executioners. They
invaded all private spaces and tried to shape every gesture, to force us to
become one of them, and that in itself was another form of execution.
In the end, when Cincinnatus is led to the scaffold, and as he lays his head
on the scaffold in preparation for his execution, he repeats the magic
mantra: "by myself." This constant reminder of his uniqueness, and his
attempts to write, to articulate and create a language different from the
one imposed upon him by his jailers, saves him at the last moment when he
takes his head in his hands and walks away toward voices that beckon him
from that other world, while the scaffold and all the sham world around him,
along with his executioner, disintegrate.
Azar Nafisi is visiting fellow, professorial lecturer, and director of The
Dialogue Project: The Culture of Democracy in Muslim Societies at Johns
Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. She has
lectured and written extensively in English and Persian on the political
implications of literature and culture as well as on the human rights of
Iranian women. Her writings include Anti-Terra: A Critical Study of
Vladimir Nabakov’s Novels and Religious Fundamentalisms and the
Human Rights of Women. Her op-eds and other articles have been published
in the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Wall
Street Journal . Her cover story, "The Veiled Threat: The Iranian
Revolution’s Woman Problem" published in The New Republic, has been
reprinted in several languages. Sidebar excerpted with permission from
Reading Lolita in Tehran: A Memoir in Books, Random House, N.Y., 2003.
*Nafisi describes this novel by Vladimir Nabokov as creating "not the actual
physical pain and torture of a totalitarian regime, but the nightmarish
quality of living in an atmosphere of perpetual dread. Cincinnatus C. is
frail, he is passive, he is a hero without knowing or acknowledging it: He
fights with his instincts, and his acts of writing are his means of escape.
He is a hero because he refuses to become like all the rest."

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